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1. Introduction
While there is by now considerable empirical evidence to support the existence of 
optimal target levels for long-run corporate liquidity holdings (e.g. Kim et al., 1998; Opler et 
al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Bruinshoofd and Kool, 2004), little evidence exists on 
possible non-linearities in the speed of adjustment towards these targets. This is particularly 
surprising since such non-linearities – motivated by liquidity or financing constraints – play 
an important role in the related corporate investment literature (e.g. Ono, 2003; Pratap, 2003). 
Obviously, such arguments should straightforwardly extend to the cash management 
literature. 
Opler et al. (1999) theoretically demonstrate that the respective shapes of the marginal 
cost and benefit curves of liquidity holdings in combination with the structure of adjustment 
costs determine the speed of corporate liquidity adjustment. In their view, target adjustment
from below may be faster than from above, due to a flat marginal cost of liquidity curve and a 
convex marginal benefit curve. At the same time, their setup supports the hypothesis that 
adjustment speed rises with the size of target deviations, especially on the lower side. Milne 
and Robertson (1996) and Pratap (2003) provide a theoretical argument for the case where 
firms are significantly below target, which is based on increasing risk aversion when 
threatened by liquidation. On the other hand, Myers and Rajan (1998) provide an argument 
for quick run-downs of too high liquidity because creditors may dislike overly liquid debtors. 
Bar-Ilan et al. (2004) argue that fixed adjustment costs may lead to non-monotonous 
adjustment through bands of inactivity around the target. Indirect adjustment costs may also 
arise, because funds directed to the stock of liquid assets cannot be used as a source of funds 
elsewhere in the firm. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) discuss the consequences of liquidity 
adjustment for the level of dividend payments, while Almeida et al. (2004) focus on the 
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consequences for future investment opportunities. To the best of our knowledge Almeida et 
al. (2004) are the only ones to explicitly test such non-linearities empirically. They split their 
sample of firms into a liquidity-constrained part and an unconstrained part. Liquidity 
dynamics of constrained firms are shown to differ from unconstrained firms.
The present paper significantly extends this literature through its empirical focus on 
non-linear corporate liquidity adjustment towards long-run targets.2 We apply an innovative 
endogenous threshold regression model to a balanced panel of 450 Dutch non-financial firms 
for the period 1986-1997.3 Table 1 describes the variables used in the analysis. We refer to the 
table for the definition of the variables.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
PercentilesVariable # Obs.
10 25 50 75 90
Standard 
deviation
Liquidity ratio (%)
Liquidity
Liquidity
Return on assets
Return on assets
Size
 Size
Interest rate
 Interest rate
5400
5400
4950
5400
4950
5400
4950
5400
4950
0.21
–6.14
–1.50
–0.00
–0.06
10.44
–0.14
0.00
–0.03
0.89
–4.72
–0.60
0.02
–0.02
10.83
–0.06
0.02
–0.01
4.45
–3.11
–0.01
0.05
0.00
11.52
0.03
0.04
–0.00
15.90
–1.84
0.51
0.10
0.02
12.51
0.12
0.06
0.01
37.02
–0.99
1.35
0.15
0.06
13.78
0.23
0.10
0.03
28.77
2.08
1.35
0.10
0.10
1.34
0.20
0.12
0.09
Notes: liquidity ratio (%) is cash and marketable securities over net assets. Liquidity is the 
logarithm of cash and marketable securities over net assets and   is the first-difference 
operator. Return on assets is earnings after depreciation, interest, taxes and extraordinary 
gains and losses, but before dividend payments to net assets; Size is the logarithm of net 
assets expressed in 1990 prices; Interest rate is interest expenses as a fraction of total debt, 
excluding debts to subsidiary companies.
2 Se for example Huang et al. (2001) for an application of a similar conceptual framework in the case of 
macroeconomic money demand.
3
 We refer to the appendix for details on sample selection.
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2. Estimating conditional adjustment with endogenous thresholds
In this section, we first provide a definition of long-run firm-specific liquidity targets. In the 
motivation of this target definition and the discussion of the relation between the target and 
long-run determinants of corporate liquidity, we extensively draw on Bruinshoofd and Kool 
(2004), which we henceforth refer to as BK04. Subsequently, we introduce a sophisticated 
threshold estimation method, developed in Hansen (1999). The advantage of this method is 
that it allows for endogenous thresholds in a non-dynamic panel. However, using it requires a 
two- step approach where estimated deviations from long-term targets are inputs in the second 
stage of threshold determination. In our view, the advantages are sufficiently strong to favor 
this approach over, for instance, a one-step VECM. Section 3 contains the empirical results of 
our analysis of conditional target adjustment in corporate liquidity holdings,
Computing Firm-level Corporate Liquidity Targets
In BK04, we start the search for long-run corporate liquidity targets using equation (1).
'
it n it i ity x  = + + . (1)
where liquidity (y) is regressed on determinants itx while i  and it denote firm-specific 
effects and a white noise error term, respectively. Note that subscript i denotes firm i, while 
subscript t denotes time. The vector itx  includes a constant, time and sector dummies and the 
potential long-run determinants size, near liquidity, total debt, short debt, average interest 
rate, earnings uncertainty and return on assets while   denotes the vector of corresponding 
parameter estimates.4 With respect to the sector dummies, we distinguish three different 
4
 For a more extensive definition and motivation of this list of long-run determinants, we refer to BK04 and 
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4
specifications of equation (1) from high to low aggregation: i) no sector dummies, ii) sector 
dummies at the 1-digit level, and iii) sector dummies at the 2-digit level.
Based on panel estimation of equation (1), we distinguish two different types of targets
in BK04. First, we define ‘sophisticated’ liquidity targets as the predicted values from the 
estimated equation (1), 'ˆˆ sophisticatedit ity x= . Since this target definition excludes the firm-specific 
fixed effect ( ˆi ), it may inappropriately ignore unobserved heterogeneity in long-run firm-
level liquidity levels. Therefore, we alternatively introduce a second target measure, the so-
called ‘specific’ target, as 'ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆspecific sophisticatedit it i it iy y x  = + = + .5 The evidence in BK04 
convincingly demonstrates that unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity plays a dominant role 
in long-run corporate liquidity levels. We therefore conclude in BK04 that firm-specific 
effects need to be included in the target definition.6 If done so, we find mean reversion to the 
‘specific’ target to equal 68 percent in one year.
In the current paper, we build on the conclusions in BK04 and use firm-specific targets 
in our analysis. To keep our panel balanced, we define the liquidity target straightforwardly as 
the historical average liquidity ratio for each firm individually.7 In table 2, we provide simple 
error-correction estimations for corporate liquidity adjustment on the basis of this target 
definition, using the following specification – identical to the one used in BK04:
ittiitiit DeviationControlsy 	 +++= 
 )1(' . (2)
Opler et al. (1999). Originally, net working capital and investment were included in the list of long-run 
determinants as well. However, they lacked statistical significance in the long-run equation and were 
subsequently dropped from the analysis. 
5 Note the resemblance of our approach with the way that debt targets have been computed in the capital 
structure literature (e.g. Auerbach 1985, Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999 and Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006).
6 This conclusion is independent of the level of aggregation of the included sector dummies; that is, even 2-digit 
sector dummies do not adequately capture individual firm’s idiosyncratic long-run liquidity levels.
7
 The motivation for this simplification is that the endogenous threshold method applied later on is tailored to 
balanced panels and it is unsure whether its asymptotic properties extend to unbalanced panels. At the same time, 
the dominance of the firm-specific effects in the cross-sectional variation of liquidity targets limits the resulting 
loss in precision.
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5
The vector Controlsit contains Return on assets,  Size, and  Interest rate. Apart from the 
baseline estimation, we also present in table 2 a number of extensions in terms of specification 
and estimation method to assess the appropriateness and robustness of our results.
Table 2
Modeling corporate liquidity adjustment
OLS
Fixed
effects
FGLS OLS OLS
Deviationi,t-1 
Return on assetsi,t
 Sizei,t
 Interest ratei,t
Liquidityi,t-1 
Constant term
Fixed time effects
–0.613
(0.021)
0.995
(0.310)
–1.031
(0.093)
–0.335
(0.257)
–
YES
NO
–0.605
(0.022)
0.979
(0.316)
–1.111
(0.101)
–0.337
(0.277)
–
YES
NO
–0.601
(0.013)
0.867
(0.111)
–1.007
(0.049)
–0.138
(0.129)
–
YES
NO
–0.635
(0.025)
0.988
(0.392)
–1.041
(0.097)
–0.308
(0.258)
0.009
(0.022)
YES
NO
–0.622
(0.021)
0.970
(0.303)
–1.068
(0.095)
–0.354
(0.260)
–
NO
YES
# observations
R-squared
F-test ‘no fixed effects’
Hausman test
Common AR(1) coefficient
4983
0.35
4983
0.35
0.22
4983
0.33
2.52
0.06
4983
0.35
4983
0.36
Notes: dependent variable is  y (Liquidity); robust standard errors are in parentheses. FGLS 
estimates assume a heterogeneous panel with an AR(1) process in the error term that is common to all 
firms. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% error level, respectively.
The first column with estimation results in table 2 presents our benchmark OLS estimation 
with robust standard errors. The mean reversion coefficient (-0.61) is close to the value found 
in BK04 where a more sophisticated firm-specific target was used. Also the coefficients on 
the control variables are qualitatively similar in size and significance to those in BK04. Only 
for the change in the interest rate, we now find an insignificant effect, as opposed to BK04. 
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Overall, the estimation result provides support for our use of a simple firm-specific historical 
average as target.
Subsequently, we introduce firm fixed effects in the mean-reversion analysis. The 
coefficients in the next column are virtually the same as for the benchmark OLS case. The F-
test that firm-specific effects are absent cannot be rejected. In the subsequent column we use 
FGLS to test for the combined presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, as these 
may affect the consistency and efficiency of the estimated parameters. Size and significance 
of the estimated parameters is very robust against this extension. Moreover, the Hausman test 
statistic suggests that this set of coefficients is statistically identical to the fixed effect 
estimates. Note also that the estimated autocorrelation coefficient is rather small and 
statistically insignificantly different from zero. Additionally allowing for cross-sectional 
correlation leads to over-identification of the model, although the parameter estimate of 
lagged target deviation (-0.697 with a standard error of 0.073) remains broadly in line with the 
benchmark OLS case. The final two columns of table 2 show extensions of the baseline OLS 
model to allow for persistence in liquidity dynamics and to capture fixed time effects. Again, 
neither one of these extensions significantly influences our results. The dynamic model 
includes the one-year lagged change in liquidity as an additional variable. Here, we use the 
fact that we failed to find statistical support for firm-fixed effects and do not need to resort to 
Arellano-Bond type estimators for the dynamic model. We conclude that lagged liquidity 
dynamics have no material impact in the equation and its inclusion does not affect the other 
parameter estimates. This finding is crucial for the next step in our analysis as the underlying 
assumptions of the Hansen method forbid the use of lags of the dependent variable among the 
explanatory variables. Our finding in table 2 thus warrants the use of the Hansen method in 
this respect. 
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The endogenous threshold method
Hansen (1999) develops a sophisticated non-dynamic panel approach to estimate threshold 
effects. To apply his method to the case of corporate liquidity adjustment, we slightly adjust 
our formulation of liquidity dynamics from equation (2) into:
ittiti
titiitiit
DeviationIDeviation
DeviationIDeviationControlsy

	
+>+
++=






)(
)(
)1(2)1(2
)1(1)1(1
'
, (3) 
 
where itControls  and ' again represent the vectors of control variables and corresponding 
coefficients, respectively, ( 1)i tDeviation 
  denotes initial liquidity holdings relative to the target 
level, i	  denotes firm-specific intercepts, and it  is an iid error term. Our focus is on the 
conditional adjustment speed j , which depends on the indicator function jI . The indicator
jI  partitions the data using the – unobservable – threshold  . For any given   the slope 
coefficients can be estimated by OLS, as evidenced by the experiments in table 2. Let 0  be 
the true threshold value and ˆ  its least squares estimate. The least squares estimate is 
obtained where the value of the error sum of squares (ESS) is minimized: 
ˆ arg min ( )ESS

 = .
As ESS( ) depends on   only through the indicator functions ( ).jI  it is a step function with 
at most nT steps, where n is the number of firms and T the number of years per firm in the 
data. To reduce the number of regressions involved, a grid search for values of 
corresponding to the quantiles of Deviationi(t-1) is applied, using the quantiles {1.00%, 1.25%, 
1.50%, ... , 89.50%, 89.75%, 99.00%}.
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Two issues of inference should be addressed. First, we need to determine the statistical 
significance of the threshold effect, i.e. evaluate the hypothesis 0 1 2:H  = . Since   is not 
identified under the null, we use bootstrapping to simulate the asymptotic distribution of the 
likelihood ratio test. P-values constructed from the bootstrap are asymptotically valid for 
n  , a condition satisfied in our data where n equals 450 (firms).8 Second, we need a 
measure of precision of our estimate of 0 . As ˆ  is a consistent estimate of 0 , for each 
evaluated in the grid search we may evaluate 0 ˆ:H  = . Confidence intervals are defined as 
a ‘no rejection region’ using the likelihood ratio statistic for tests on   ( ( )LR  ). A test of 
0 ˆ:H  =  rejects at the asymptotic level 	  if ( )LR   exceeds the critical value ( )c 	 . Hence 
the ‘no rejection region’ of confidence level 1 	
  is the set of   such that ( ) ( )LR c 	 . 
Note that ( )LR   is a re-normalization of the error sum of squares for each value of   and 
therefore a by-product of model estimation. The method extends in a natural manner to 
models with multiple thresholds. We refer to Hansen (1999) for technical details.
3. Results
We now turn to the joint estimation of thresholds levels and regression coefficients as 
formulated in equation (3). Table 3 contains the results.
Panel A presents formal threshold effects test results, which suggest a triple threshold 
model.9 Panel B of the table reports the threshold estimates themselves along with 95% 
confidence bands. Here we see that the middle threshold is positive but insignificantly
8
 Since the likelihood ratio test statistic may not be asymptotically pivotal, a word of caution on the efficiency of 
the bootstrapped test statistic is warranted. The errors of bootstrap estimates of the distribution of statistics that 
are not asymptotically pivotal converge to zero at the same rate as the errors made by first-order asymptotic 
approximations (see Horowitz, 2001).
9
 Additionally, Shapiro-Francia W’ tests for normality of the residuals of the triple-threshold model reveal that at 
the 99% confidence level normality is accepted for more than 90% of the firms in our sample.
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Table 3
Threshold effects, threshold estimates, and regression results
PANEL A: Test statistics for threshold effects
Single threshold (P-value)
Double threshold (P-value)
Triple threshold (P-value)
41.6
16.2
13.7
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
PANEL B: Threshold estimates
ˆ 1 (95% confidence interval)
ˆ 2 (95% confidence interval)
ˆ 3 (95% confidence interval)
–2.86
0.85
3.05
(–3.03; –2.73)
(–0.58; 1.50)
(2.86; 3.05)
PANEL C: Regression results a)
Return on assets i,t
 Size i,t
 Interest rate i,t
Deviation i,t–1 × I(Deviation i,t–1  ˆ 1) 
Deviation i,t–1 × I(ˆ 1 < Deviation i,t–1  ˆ 2) 
Deviation i,t–1 × I(ˆ 2 < Deviation i,t–1  ˆ 3) 
Deviation i,t–1 × I(ˆ 3 < Deviation i,t–1)
Firm-specific intercepts
0.71
–1.20
–0.36
–0.87
–0.68
–0.45
–0.66
YES
(0.36)
(0.11)
(0.26)
(0.06)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.10)
a)
 Dependent variable is  y (Liquidity). All variables are defined as before. 
White standard errors are in parentheses.
different from zero. Unreported results show that our estimates are only marginally affected 
by restricting the second threshold to equal zero. For the remainder of the discussion we shall 
therefore interpret the second threshold as being zero. The first and third threshold estimates 
are particularly low and high, corresponding with liquidity shortfalls of more than 95% below 
the target and liquidity surpluses of over 2000% above the target, respectively. Although the 
third threshold effect is statistically significant, the regime above the third threshold contains 
only about 50 observations and the estimated threshold estimate is implausibly high. We 
check the robustness of this threshold by alternately winsorizing and censoring the data. We 
winsorize our data by removing firms from the sample in such a way that a minimum number 
of firms is deleted while a maximum number of extreme target deviations is removed from the 
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sample.10 We censor our data by replacing the deviations of the top and bottom 1% of the 
deviations distribution with the 99th and the 1st quantile values, respectively.11 The results of 
these sensitivity checks – presented in table 4 – show that in either case the third threshold 
effect loses statistical significance, while the other thresholds effects as well as the regression 
coefficients remain broadly unchanged. 
Table 4
Estimation results using winsorized and censored data 
Winsorized, uncensored 
sample
Full, censored
Sample
PANEL A: Test statistics for threshold effects
Single threshold (P-value)
Double threshold (P-value)
Triple threshold (P-value)
55.0
16.3
6.4
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.33)
67.0
12.9
7.8
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.15)
PANEL B: Threshold estimates
ˆ 1 (95% confidence interval)
ˆ 2 (95% confidence interval)
ˆ 3 (95% confidence interval)
–2.98
0.85
-
(–2.99; –2.77)
(–1.22; 1.50)
–2.99
0.85
-
(–2.99; –2.99)
(–1.72; 1.54)
PANEL C: Regression results a)
Return on assets i,t
 Size i,t
 Interest rate i,t
Deviation i,t–1 ×
    I(Deviation i,t–1  ˆ 1) 
Deviation i,t–1 ×
    I(ˆ 1 < Deviation i,t–1  ˆ 2) 
Deviation i,t–1 ×
    I(ˆ 2 < Deviation i,t–1  ˆ 3) 
Deviation i,t–1 ×
    I(ˆ 3 < Deviation i,t–1)
Firm-specific intercepts
1.18
–1.16
–0.22
–0.95
–0.67
–0.49
-
YES
(0.26)
(0.11)
(0.23)
(0.07)
(0.03)
(0.04)
0.77
–1.21
–0.33
–1.00
–0.67
–0.51
-
YES
(0.33)
(0.11)
(0.26)
(0.07)
(0.03)
(0.04)
a)
 Dependent variable is  y (Liquidity). All variables are defined as before. White 
standard errors are in parentheses.
10
 The Hansen (1999) methodology is tailored to balanced panels, while it is unsure whether its asymptotic 
properties extend to unbalanced panels. We therefore aim to keep the panel balanced and remove seventeen
firms entirely from the sample rather than unbalancing our panel by removing individual observations.
11
 We have also censored at the 2nd and 98th quantile. This hardly affects the outcomes.
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The regression coefficients are in Panel C of table 2. Regarding the control variables –
changes in earnings, size and interest rates – we note that the coefficient signs are in line with 
the literature. Our main finding is that the speed of adjustment towards the target significantly 
differs across regimes. The differences are not only significant in a statistical sense, but are 
also economically meaningful. Specifically, our results reveal that firms respond to liquidity 
shortages considerably faster than they do to liquidity surpluses. Roughly speaking, firms 
correct liquidity surpluses at a rate of about forty-five percent per year, while they remove 
liquidity shortages at a rate of nearly seventy percent. For liquidity positions that fall 
particularly far short of the target (Deviationi(t-1)  ˆ 1), we even find nearly full target 
adjustment within a year. The latter result, however, may reflect survivorship effects 
stemming from our use of a balanced panel. Consequently, it may not generalize to other 
samples. We also find that firms respond to particularly large liquidity surpluses (Deviationi(t-
1) > ˆ 3) faster than they do to more moderate surpluses. As this third threshold is not robust to 
either winsorizing or censoring, we caution against strong conclusions from this observation. 
Lastly, our results do not support the notion of a range of inaction around target liquidity 
holdings.
4. Conclusions
The main finding in this paper is that firms bring back liquidity holdings to targeted 
levels at a faster rate when they are initially below the target than when they start out above 
the target. No evidence is found to support the existence of bands of inactivity around the 
target.
Our results reveal a stronger corporate preference for removing liquidity shortages 
than for removing liquidity surpluses. In relation to the literature on corporate investment and 
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dividend payments, these findings suggests that liquidity shortages are more likely to spill 
over in the form of curbed investment outlays or cuts to dividend payments than liquidity 
surpluses are likely to feed additional investment outlays or increases in dividend payments.
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Appendix. Sample selection
Our sample is selected from Statistics Netherlands’ data on the Finances of Large Firms 
(SFGO) covering the period 1977-1997. The SFGO provides company specific financial 
information at the level of balance sheet and income statement items for all Dutch non-
financial firms with a balance sheet length of at least 20 million Dutch guilders (about EUR 
9.1 million). On an annual basis, the data cover 80 to 90 percent of the population.
Occasionally, firms do not report in a given year so that missing data entries arise. In 
some cases, firms may leave due to financial distress raising the issue of survivorship bias or 
because they drop below the threshold level of assets. However, in many other cases firms do
not leave but simply do not report their financial statements to SFGO in one or more years 
after which they return. We are unable to distinguish between these different cases. As the 
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asymptotic properties of our empirical methodology are known only for balanced panels, we 
exclude firms with missing data.
In the early years, the number of firms on which Statistics Netherlands reports is quite 
small. Moreover, data then only cover the manufacturing sector. Data on the services sector 
start becoming available in 1983 and coverage increases substantially in the first years after. 
Therefore, we construct our balanced panel starting in 1986. Utilities firms are excluded from 
the sample and three more firms are removed because they display extreme volatility in 
liquidity dynamics. At the end of the day we have a balanced panel with 450 firms covering 
the period 1986-1997.
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